Guatemala Coup |
GUATEMALA 1954
On May 23, 1997 the CIA released several hundred formerly classified documents pertaining to the United States involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala. Although representing only a fraction of the existing government files, these records nonetheless revealed the determination of the CIA to prohibit the spread of communism to the nations of Latin America during the Cold War. Planning for American intervention in Guatemala began in 1952 when the president of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, solicited U.S. assistance to overthrow the democratically elected (1950) Guatemalan leader, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Apprehensive of Arbenz’s land reform efforts and the freedom afforded to the communist party under the current regime, President Truman authorized the shipment of weapons and money to anti-Arbenz groups. Within five weeks the operation to topple Arbenz quickly fizzled when representatives loyal to the president uncovered the plot and took steps to solidify their power.
Despite the short duration and negligible results of its first intrusion in Guatemala, the CIA found renewed support for their aggressive course of action in Latin America with the Eisenhower administration. Touting his New Look Doctrine, Eisenhower, hoping to differentiate his foreign policy from the plan to contain communism promoted by Truman, sought to defend American interests abroad with an increase in funds for nuclear weapons and covert operations. Convinced that Arbenz threatened U.S. national security because of his alleged Communist sympathies, Eisenhower approved the first-ever clandestine military action in Latin America. Codenamed PBSUCCESS, the program aimed at not only deposing Arbenz in favor of a U.S.-selected leader, but also looked to send a clear warning to the Soviets that the American government would not tolerate the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.
By 1953, the highly secretive PBSUCCESS had become a top priority for CIA officials. Prohibited by Eisenhower from using American troops to accomplish their goals in Guatemala, the CIA established training camps for the opposition army in the bordering nations of Nicaragua and Honduras. To compensate for both the small number of men choosing to involve themselves in the operation and the widespread support for the Arbenz government, the CIA devised a massive propaganda campaign in Guatemala to convince the populace of the invincibility of the forces seeking to take control of the country. Furthermore, CIA agents also conducted an intense psychological battle against the supporters of Arbenz, ranging from phone warnings in the middle of the night to death threats. On June 18, 1954, after approximately one year of preparation, U.S.- backed troops invaded Guatemala with the intention of overthrowing Arbenz. Realizing his army had forsaken him and fearing for his life, Arbenz resigned as president on June 27th and fled to Mexico. The U.S.-chosen leader of the military coup, Carlos Castillo Armas, assumed control of the government, thus ensuring the promotion of American interests in Guatemala.
Shortly following the change of power in Guatemala, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles met with Eisenhower to discuss the details of PBSUCCESS. During the presidential briefing, Dulles and other CIA officials exaggerated the efficiency of the program, claiming only one U.S.-backed soldier perished, when in reality, at least forty-eight men lost their lives in the attack. Consequently, Eisenhower and later American presidents came to rely on covert operations when faced with the threat of communism in Latin America; based on the faulty assumption that the overthrow of Arbenz was quick and bloodless, PBSUCCESS became the model for future CIA actions in the region. However, despite the initial determination that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala served as a triumph over communism, the decision to remove an elected leader by force seemed flawed when members of the army assassinated Castillo Armas only three years after he gained power. The aggressive American foreign policy implemented during the early years of the Cold War in Guatemala, therefore, succeeded in its immediate goal of removing a suspected communist sympathizer, but the unforeseen consequences of PBSUCESS (four decades of instability and civil war in Guatemala) remain the ultimate legacy of the initial CIA covert operation in Latin America.
On May 23, 1997 the CIA released several hundred formerly classified documents pertaining to the United States involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala. Although representing only a fraction of the existing government files, these records nonetheless revealed the determination of the CIA to prohibit the spread of communism to the nations of Latin America during the Cold War. Planning for American intervention in Guatemala began in 1952 when the president of Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza, solicited U.S. assistance to overthrow the democratically elected (1950) Guatemalan leader, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Apprehensive of Arbenz’s land reform efforts and the freedom afforded to the communist party under the current regime, President Truman authorized the shipment of weapons and money to anti-Arbenz groups. Within five weeks the operation to topple Arbenz quickly fizzled when representatives loyal to the president uncovered the plot and took steps to solidify their power.
Despite the short duration and negligible results of its first intrusion in Guatemala, the CIA found renewed support for their aggressive course of action in Latin America with the Eisenhower administration. Touting his New Look Doctrine, Eisenhower, hoping to differentiate his foreign policy from the plan to contain communism promoted by Truman, sought to defend American interests abroad with an increase in funds for nuclear weapons and covert operations. Convinced that Arbenz threatened U.S. national security because of his alleged Communist sympathies, Eisenhower approved the first-ever clandestine military action in Latin America. Codenamed PBSUCCESS, the program aimed at not only deposing Arbenz in favor of a U.S.-selected leader, but also looked to send a clear warning to the Soviets that the American government would not tolerate the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.
By 1953, the highly secretive PBSUCCESS had become a top priority for CIA officials. Prohibited by Eisenhower from using American troops to accomplish their goals in Guatemala, the CIA established training camps for the opposition army in the bordering nations of Nicaragua and Honduras. To compensate for both the small number of men choosing to involve themselves in the operation and the widespread support for the Arbenz government, the CIA devised a massive propaganda campaign in Guatemala to convince the populace of the invincibility of the forces seeking to take control of the country. Furthermore, CIA agents also conducted an intense psychological battle against the supporters of Arbenz, ranging from phone warnings in the middle of the night to death threats. On June 18, 1954, after approximately one year of preparation, U.S.- backed troops invaded Guatemala with the intention of overthrowing Arbenz. Realizing his army had forsaken him and fearing for his life, Arbenz resigned as president on June 27th and fled to Mexico. The U.S.-chosen leader of the military coup, Carlos Castillo Armas, assumed control of the government, thus ensuring the promotion of American interests in Guatemala.
Shortly following the change of power in Guatemala, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles met with Eisenhower to discuss the details of PBSUCCESS. During the presidential briefing, Dulles and other CIA officials exaggerated the efficiency of the program, claiming only one U.S.-backed soldier perished, when in reality, at least forty-eight men lost their lives in the attack. Consequently, Eisenhower and later American presidents came to rely on covert operations when faced with the threat of communism in Latin America; based on the faulty assumption that the overthrow of Arbenz was quick and bloodless, PBSUCCESS became the model for future CIA actions in the region. However, despite the initial determination that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala served as a triumph over communism, the decision to remove an elected leader by force seemed flawed when members of the army assassinated Castillo Armas only three years after he gained power. The aggressive American foreign policy implemented during the early years of the Cold War in Guatemala, therefore, succeeded in its immediate goal of removing a suspected communist sympathizer, but the unforeseen consequences of PBSUCESS (four decades of instability and civil war in Guatemala) remain the ultimate legacy of the initial CIA covert operation in Latin America.
Source: Kathleen Johnson, Volunteer for the Cold War Museum, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/guatemala.asp